This paper uses an innovation theory lens to assess the potential for operationally responsive space to increase the ability of government space acquisition to meet the emerging needs of Joint Combatant Commanders. Two core challenges of generating innovation in national security space are identified: 1) enabling bottom-up initiative in a monopsony market structure; and 2) fostering an entrepreneurial environment for both component and system level concept development within an increasingly risk-averse system. The current military acquisition system addresses these challenges through a two-tiered process which separates technology development from project-based acquisition. However, this method of separation is not a complete solution as: 1) it fails to value the importance of architectural innovation; 2) it creates a disaggregated knowledge base which exacerbates the difficulty of top-down specification and bottom-up integration; and 3) fails to generate an entrepreneurial supply-side spirit. The operationally responsive space paradigm has the potential to resolve parts of this issue by generating a more dynamic acquisition environment; however, it remains to be seen whether the required significant philosophical change can be achieved in practice.
I. Introduction
ESPITE a rich legacy of delivering impressive technology, government space acquisitions are increasingly characterized by schedule slips and cost overruns (e.g., AEHF, NPOESS, SBIRS-High, GPS II). 1 In recent years, in an effort to address these problems, multiple blue ribbon panels have been convened. Bringing to bear the members' vast experience working in the current acquisition paradigm of large monolithic spacecraft, their recommendations emphasize a "back-to-basics" philosophy (i.e., maturing payload technologies outside of acquisition programs). However, with the changing needs of today's warfighter, it may be the acquisition paradigm itself that needs fixing.
One complementary solution may be the emerging operationally responsive space (ORS) paradigm, which pursues a fundamentally different approach to spacecraft acquisition. Rather than emphasizing the delivery of longlived, global, high-performance space capabilities, ORS missions envision pursuing short-term space capabilities tailored for specific operational scenarios. Although ORS solutions will sacrifice performance on traditional measures of effectiveness with employment of smaller satellites and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology, ORS offers large improvements in schedule performance as well as an opportunity to customize capability for emergent mission requirements.
Fundamentally, the goal of defense space acquisition is to facilitate the meeting of the Joint Combatant Commanders emerging needs. This can involve generating a wholly new capability, or reducing the resources required to achieve an existing capability (e.g., making the system cheaper or lighter). Encouraging innovation (i.e., generating capabilities to meet un-met needs) is a difficult problem in general and characteristics of the defense space sector make it harder still. The monopsony-oligopoly market structure and complexities of the product and associated operating environment limit the ways in which natural market dynamics can drive change.
In this paper, an innovation theory lens is used to assess the potential for ORS to increase the ability of government space acquisition to meet the emerging needs of the Joint Combatant Commanders. Figure 1 presents a conceptual map of this assessment. The discussion is structured around four key issues associated with spacecraft D innovation. For each, the issue is first explained in terms of the impact of characteristics of the space sector on the ability of mechanisms capable of encouraging innovation in traditional markets to function. Second, the current acquisition system is examined to determine how and to what extent it overcomes each of these challenges. Third, the ORS paradigm is evaluated to determine how it could contribute to the spacecraft innovation process.
Figure 1. Conceptual Outline of Analysis Approach
Before delving into the implications of the unique characteristics of the space market, it is worth highlighting the nature of the difference. This can be most easily understood with reference to the traditional (i.e., relatively simple, nearly competitive and mostly unregulated) baseline market as shown in Figure 2 . Particular aspects of the figure will be examined in detail, in the sections that follow, as they pertain to each implication. For now, it is sufficient to note that in the space sector, the functions of buyer are divided into three distinct entities -users (warfighters), appropriators (Congress) and acquirers (acquisition officers) -and centralized as a monopsony. This is different from the traditional buy-side, which is composed of many, heterogeneous buyers, acting independently. In the space sector, the sell-side is characterized by a stable oligopoly with an ad hoc supply-chain based on project-by-project teaming arrangements. This is in contrast to the traditional sell-side, where there is typically continuous turnover and stable supply chains. Finally, whereas the space sector transaction is formal, discrete and highly regulated, with the price negotiated for each acquisition, the traditional transaction is informal, at arms length, and with standard prices set through nearly continuous interaction of buyers and sellers. Innovation occurs at the intersection of capability "push" and needs "pull," yet, the space market structure enforces a predominantly top-down "pull" acquisition process. This unidirectionality of the space innovation drive is exacerbated by the knowledge disaggregation that exists on both the buy-and sell-sides of the market.
A. Issue 1a: The monopsony-oligopoly market structure enforces a top-down acquisition process
Taking a classical economic view of innovation, market transactions are thought to be the fundamental driver of innovation. In a competitive market, both the consumer's needs and the supplier's capabilities are revealed through the mechanism of price. 2 Innovation occurs (i.e., unmet needs are met) over time, through the continuous interaction of market pull and capabilities push. 3 However, the market for spacecraft is neither competitive on the buy-, nor sellside, and this holds important implications for innovation. Firstly, a monopsony market is discrete and specific since the market only exists when the buyer wants to buy, and as a result, user needs must be specified explicitly since there is no aggregate buyer behavior out on the open market from which they can be inferred. Further, in the stable oligopoly that exists on the space sector sell-side, there is little incentive for contractors to invest in innovation on their own; they tend to innovate in response to customer/user requests.
In the traditional market conception (as illustrated in Fig. 2 ), transactions can occur in one of two ways. Products are either sold by a third party retailer in a store, in which case prices are relatively standardized (i.e., every person will be charged the same amount for a given capability). Or, more customized products (i.e., a new roof for a home) and the labor associated with its installation are contracted directly with the supplier. Even in this case, enough sufficiently similar transactions occur to establish a market price. For the most part, buyers are limited to whatever is currently available on the market; however, the state-of-the-art is constantly changing to meet new needs. For example, if you decided to replace an iPod that was bought three years ago, in today's market you would expect to be faced with a different set of better model choices. Although you personally hadn't continued to reveal your preferences through ongoing purchases, the other millions of consumers had. Thus, as long as your values align with those of the general market, the continuous market feedback process will have driven innovation to create a next generation iPod model that better suits your needs.
In the space sector, the monopsony-oligopoly market structure precludes this continuous interaction of needs and capabilities and, in combination with the specialized nature of space products, the standardization of price. This is because a monopsony market is discrete; that is, the market only exists when they buyer wants to buy. Returning to the iPod example, if you were the only buyer of iPods in the world and you hadn't bought one in three years, you couldn't very well expect the state-of-the-art to have changed much in that time. Why would suppliers invest in developing new technology that wouldn't be bought, just so that it would be ready for whenever you did decide to buy again? You would have to be a pretty important buyer for that to happen, and even still, your iPod price would likely include much of the development costs. In fact, while the situation described above is certainly a caricature, it is representative of the realities of government acquisition of spacecraft. The government is often, for all intents and purposes, the only customer, and it is not uncommon for 10-20 years to elapse between major government acquisitions (of a particular program type). Yet each generation is required to be significantly more capable than the last. 4 Another byproduct of this discrete interaction is that the market is also specific. Where in the traditional case, buyers are limited to what's available on the market, in the space sector, the government is the whole market; if the government doesn't buy it, it won't be sold. As a result, the buyer's needs and preferences must be revealed explicitly, thereby dictating what should be produced. Further, while a monopsony buy-side does not preclude pricecompetition among sellers 2 , the above iPod example should give an intuitive understanding of why the incentives for such competition are weak. Specifically, the market growth potential is limited (by the needs of the government), the profit margins are quite small (as regulated by Federal Acquisition Regulations) and the barriers to entry are high (significant complementary assets and specialized knowledge are required for satellite manufacturing). These factors all contribute to the sell-side oligopoly that exists, resulting in the suppression of bottom-up capability development.
Extent to which the current DoD structure resolves the issue
In order to generate the necessary technology "push," the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process employs a two-tiered organizational structure focused on (1) research and development and (2) Once these innovation organizations mature concepts to the point where they can be realistically assessed for cost, schedule, and performance contributions to a given set of program requirements, they may be considered as part of the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. JCIDS constitutes the formal DoD procedure for the establishment of acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs and assesses alternatives for meeting a validated warfighting need. Created to replace service-specific requirements generation systems, JCIDS is driven by the needs of US Combatant Commanders with an emphasis on interoperability. JCIDS is a consensus-driven system that attempts to integrate the preferences of multiple stakeholders in the defense establishment by examining (perceived) capability shortfalls or gaps of the Combatant Commanders or Secretary of Defense. Then, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and Functional Control Boards (FCB) vet the requests-considering their validity as well as the possibility for addressing shortfalls with materiel (physical system) and non-materiel solutions (e.g., new procedure, training). Figure 3 takes a highly simplified view of the acquisition process to illustrate how the two-tiered process generates the necessary push, despite its top-down structure. In fig. 3 , capability-push is denoted with red arrows and need-pull with blue. Nominally, the formal part of the acquisition process matches user needs with relatively mature technologies to drive system-level innovation as dictated by the innovation theory. However, that pool of capabilities is not being created and marketed by the supply-side as would be the case in a traditional market. The lead on technology development efforts is still primarily the domain of the government, albeit a separate branch (both organizationally and culturally). The lab structure, as described above, contributes in two main ways: they conduct fundamental research in areas that may one day be of use to the Joint Combatant Commanders, and they fund technology development contracts and studies. Although these contracts tend to be less specific, and the acquirers tend to be more technically knowledgeable, than in the formal acquisitions, they follow the same general pattern; the customer identifies a need and puts out a request for comment, based on the response a more formal request for proposals is released, leading to a contractual relationship.
As a result, rather than the confluence of pullpush forces which drive innovation in a traditional market, the space drive is characterized by a coordinated pull-push-pull. One key disadvantage of this approach to topdown capability generation is that it creates a situation where much of the investment in product development for space applications originates from the government. 4 Also, while this system does technically create the required push, it is a fundamentally different push force than the independently supply-side initiated one described in the traditional market. The implication of this difference will be discussed in the sections that follow.
The potential improvements offered by ORS
Operationally Responsive Space has been defined broadly by the Department of Defense as "assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders' needs...while also maintaining the ability to address other users' needs for improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to meet national security requirements." 5 The purpose of ORS is to reduce the time constants associated with space system acquisition, design, and operation to allow the national space architecture to keep pace with changing missions, environments, and technologies. The fundamental idea is to trade off the reliability and performance achieved by existing spacecraft for the speed, responsiveness, and customization which may be achieved by architectures that incorporate elements such as small, modular spacecraft and low-cost, commercial launch vehicles. 6 In terms of the structure described in Fig. 3 , ORS is typically grouped into the category of technology development; however its functions really span both the roles of technology development and spacecraft acquisition. This has two key implications with respect to issue 1a (i.e., that the monopsony-oligopoly market structure enforces a top-down acquisition process).
Firstly, by leveraging COTS parts and commercial launch services, it creates a potential market for unarticulated products. In other words, acquisition agents would be able to use "on-the-market" features to help define their need, in the same way that traditional customers are accustomed to doing. This is in stark contrast to the existing paradigm where acquisition agents define their needs in advance of the product being designed. The key difference is that the monopsonist buyer may now buy things for which they didn't specifically ask. This may generate more bottom-up initiative from the space industrial base and provide avenues for small, innovative companies to enter the DoD market. 6 This process will be encouraged through a model of seed-funding rather than development contracts. Where the historical lab structure, to a first order approximation, specifies a need and pays for the development required to meet it, the seed-funding model would allocate funding to firms in the early stages of a promising development. Conceptually, the difference between these two approaches is significant; the latter has the potential to reach non-traditional space firms and leverage bottom-up initiative, where the former perpetuates the traditional pull-push-pull. It remains to be seen whether the practical difference will be significant.
Secondly, the emphasis on rapid development cycles might create a more continuous innovation environment. One of the problems with the discrete nature of a monopsony market, as discussed above, is that it limits the opportunities for new capabilities to be "needed," while at the same time placing a high premium on major intergenerational improvements. Both of these factors serve to limit the incentives for bottom-up initiative. What the ORS paradigm may change (from the point of view of generating real push) is to create a more frequent market for incremental improvements. If there is a clear opportunity to capture the value of taking the functionality of a spacecraft beyond the specification, contractors may be more inclined to take the initiative. The necessity for a top-down process as described above could theoretically foster ideal conditions for innovation because a knowledgeable buyer could: 1) encourage investment in R&D by specifying sufficiently advanced needs that can only be solved through radical innovation; and 2) decrease information asymmetries in the transactions by eliminating the need for suppliers to infer the future preferences of potential buyers. However in practice, the specialized knowledge required to drive change is fragmented across the space market structure, limiting the effectiveness of both 1 and 2 above. This section explains why knowledge fragmentation exacerbates the challenge of integrating bottom-up push with top-down pull.
The Knowledge Required for Innovation:
The innovation literature has historically differentiated between two types of innovation: incremental and radical (see for example ref. 7, 8) . Incremental innovations are competence-enhancing; they generate a product that is better along dimensions that are familiar within the current paradigm. Radical innovations, on the other hand, are competence-destroying; they typically take a different approach to solving the same problem. For example, building bigger communication satellites that can carry more transponders would be an incremental innovation approach to increasing capacity, while developing a new method of stabilization (i.e., the transition from spin-stabilized to threeaxis) is a way of addressing the same problem with a radical innovation. If established suppliers are driving change, not surprisingly, there is a tendency to avoid competence-destroying change; 9 however, if change is driven from the top, as in the space sector, by specifying sufficiently advanced needs, radical change may be the only option, thereby legitimating the risk.
However, in more complex product systems, Henderson and Clark 10 observed that more than one type of knowledge is required to generate radical innovation. They differentiated between component level knowledge and architectural knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the linkages between components), which leads to a two dimensional spectrum of innovation types as shown in Fig. 4 . When these categories of knowledge are mapped onto the space market structure (see Fig. 3 ), they are concentrated on the sell-side and divided between system integrators and component suppliers. This means that while acquisition agents may be in a position to drive radical innovation, they may not have all the knowledge and experience required to do so. Further, unlike in the traditional market conception, where firms tend to establish stable supply-chain relationships (which enable them to integrate both component and architectural knowledge), in the space sector, stable relationships are effectively discouraged by the project-by-project acquisition structure. This further complicates the problem of determining the feasibility of future projects.
The Challenge of Needs Representation
The second potential advantage of a top-down approach is that it eliminates the need for user preferences to be inferred by suppliers. In the business strategy literature, there is an increasing emphasis on the importance of market research and capturing lead user innovation. Von Hippel argues (as for example in ref. 11) that understanding how a product can be extended (as is often done post-market by leading edge users) and what works for which customer is critical in driving next-generation innovation. The idea is that people who actually use the product will be more likely to find its limits and potential extensions than engineers in a lab environment. Given that the monopsony market structure forces the buyers to express their needs explicitly, one might expect the rate of innovation to be increased. However, the monopsony buyer is not a single entity with cohesive interests, rendering the process less efficient rather than more.
As shown in Fig. 2 , in the traditional market conception, buyers are a relatively homogenous group of individuals or firms acting in their own interests. They determine what to buy based on an internal evaluation of their relative wants, budget and what is available on the market. In the space sector, the buyer is a monopsonist acting to acquire a public good. This means that while the immediate use of a military communication satellite may be to relay tactical information to the deployed warfighter, the overall goal is increased national security, from which everyone benefits. As a result, while Congress appropriates funds for defense spending, that money originates from the pockets of individual citizens through taxation. Thus, in theory we each buy our share of the satellite as required to preserve our need for security. Practically speaking, however, the average person has no concept of what the satellite needs are, or how much they should cost. Therefore, government acquisition agencies exist to pool resources -both financial and knowledge-based -to correct for this "commons" problem. However, the byproduct of this pooling is a monopsony buyer that is a single entity (from a transaction point of view) and a composite of competing organizational interests (from an internal decision making point of view). This is the worst of both worlds because the plurality of ideas needed to catalyze innovation are more easily generated through competition, while a plurality of interests complicates decision making.
While the nature of the monopsony buyers' interests is not dissimilar to that of the traditional buyer, in practice, having the interests disaggregated across organizational boundaries makes a significant difference. Rather than making an internally consistent determination of preferences, acquisition agents must integrate the inputs of needs (as expressed by the warfighters who use the system and possess the best understanding of how different systems will affect them operationally), budgetary constraints (as imposed by Congress which appropriates the funds and has the best appreciation for how spending in one sector will affect the overall national purse) and technical feasibility (as inferred from industry studies, in-house experts and through the contracting process). This creates a principal agent problem and complicates the needs representation process significantly. The key implication is that the ability of the space buyer to drive the radical innovation expected of spacecraft acquisitions is limited by incomplete architectural, component, operational and budgetary knowledge; all of which play an important role in driving change.
Extent to which the current DoD structure resolves the issue
The short answer is that the acquisition structure does not address the knowledge disaggregation problem well. In fact, issue 1b (i.e., knowledge disaggregation) is in a sense a byproduct of the structure that exists to resolve issue 1a (i.e., insufficient bottom-up push). Currently, acquisition officers are faced with the enormous challenge of integrating architectural, component, operational and budgetary knowledge, none of which is necessarily their primary expertise. The blue ribbon panels are almost unanimous in their identification of this problem (see Fig. 5 ). However, their recommendations to increase the technical competence of the acquisition core and emphasize the importance of front-end specification only address half of the problem. No matter how many new capabilities are generated, their value will hinge on how well the original need was represented as a set of requirements. Restore funding for testing space technologies X X Maintain U.S. technological lead in space X Keep R&D separate from systems acquisition X X Identify technology for rapid exploitation and control X Establish Presidential and NSC space advisory groups X Integrate defense and intelligence space activities X Improve front-end systems engineering (req's=resources) X X X X X Improve collaboration on requirements X X X X Budget space programs to most probable (80/20) cost X Evaluate contractor cost credibility in source selections X Conduct independent program assessments at MDA's X Do not allow requirements creep X X X X Match PM tenure with delivery of a product X X X X Pursue incremental increases in capability X Withold contractor award fees when goals not met X Establish a stable program funding account X Structure development to achieve IOC within 3-7 years X Recognize space as top national security priority X Deter and defend against hostile acts in space X End practice of appointing only flight-rated CINCSPACE X Incentivize government career paths in acquisitions X X X X X Improve workforce technical competence X X X X X Research systems architecting design tools X Establish mission success as guiding principle X Compete acquisitions only when in best interest of gov't X Develop integrated strategy for R&D and acquisitions X X Encourage LSI to compete major subsystems X Evaluate gov't internal training programs for acquisition 
The potential for improvements offered by ORS
While ORS will likely be unable to resolve the needs representation issue since all requests will continue to originate from a Joint Warfare Commanders needs (in theory), the new structure may lessen the knowledge disaggregation problem through its streamlined organization. Just as the rapid development cycles pursued by the ORS Joint Program Office may strengthen the DoD industrial base by providing more opportunities for small, innovative firms, the approach might also improve the technical competency of space professionals by providing more opportunities for mid-career program managers to manage small-scale projects. As noted in a recent GAO report, 6 Navy and Air Force lab officials have found that the TacSat experiments have provided more hands-on and lifecycle management experience than would otherwise be possible on larger acquisition efforts.
Addressing the principal agent problem inherent in the acquisition system is more challenging and the role of ORS is less clear. Given the extreme specialization required to develop and manage national security space assets, a large degree of organizational decomposition is inevitable. However, ORS does show some promise in reducing the magnitude of this negative effect. In addition to mitigating the complexity of traditional space assets by nature of a smaller design paradigm, the ORS approach brings the warfighter closer to the acquisition process through its streamlined concept-of-operations. On the front-end, the tactical control provided to the warfighter by ORS assets may enable the lead-user innovation discussed in the previous section. On the back-end, the direct downlink of satellite data to the warfighter (removing many traditional layers of analysis) may concretize the value of alternative satellite capabilities for improved needs representation in future satellite developments. This hypothesis will need to be tested over time.
III. Challenge 2: Creating the organizational environment that best fosters the different phases of innovation
Different phases of the innovation process are best enabled by different organizational structures (i.e., organic, entrepreneurial, interdisciplinary, free to experiment and fail for the early phases; increasingly structured, optimizing along particular prescribed dimensions as the product matures). Yet, space products do not fit well into traditional characterizations of product maturity, leading to a poor fit between management strategies and goals. Further, the highly visible nature of space has created undue pressure on success every time that is detrimental to innovation.
A. Issue 2a: Different acquisition structures suit different phases of development
Utterback and Abernathy 18, 19 observed that the innovation process proceeds in three phases -fluid, transitional, and specific, as shown in Table 1 . During the fluid phase, the emphasis is on just getting the product to work. Lots of new, and very different, radical ideas are being tried. Some work, but many don't; it's a time of free experimentation. As a result of the high risk associated with this type of endeavor, the fluid phase is often carried out by entrepreneurial start-ups or single inventors working out of their garage. The goal is to prove-out the concept to the point that a larger company will buy-into the idea and facilitate its commercialization. Thus begins the transitional phase. During the transitional phase, the emphasis is on making the invention mass producible. As a result, the product innovations tend to be architectural in nature. There may continue to be many players in the industry, but the number drops quickly after a dominant design emerges (e.g., the QWERTY keyboard set the standard for physical interfaces to computers). Where entrepreneurial organizations are best suited to the free experimentation required for the fluid phase, a more formal structure is required to standardize and commercialize the product in the transitional phase. And, once the standardization has occurred, this marks the beginning of the specific phase.
During the specific phase, the goal is to optimize the design within the framework of the dominant design. Changes tend to be incremental, reducing costs and increasing quality as the process improves. As the manufacturing process becomes increasingly specialized, investment in complementary assets leads to a market composed of few established firms with strong market positions. Unlike in the fluid and transitional phase, where the biggest threats are a lingering perception that the old way is better and losing out to competitors working in the same phase, in the specific phase, the biggest threat is complacency. There will always be entrepreneurial firms bringing in disruptive innovation; and so the cycle repeats itself.
There are very clear differences between the types of organizational environments that enable each phase of innovation. In the traditional market, different structures can easily be applied in each phase because the phases proceed relatively sequentially and distinctly. However, space products tend to integrate elements of each phase making the process harder to decouple. For example, many spacecraft are phase-wise 1) fluid phase prototypes at the system level, in that they are accomplishing a task that has never previously been accomplished; 2) built out of transitional components on the way to being standardized; and 3) machined using highly specialized specific phase equipment. Yet, since they are developed as a single project, a single organizational environment exists throughout. As a result, this single supporting organization incorporates elements to facilitate each phase, but is not optimized for any. 19 
Extent to which the current DoD process resolves the issue
In addition to generating the necessary capability push (as discussed in challenge 1), the "formal acquisition"/"technology development" separation has the effect of creating different innovation environments for different phases of development. These differences are highlighted in Table 2 . For funding purposes, the capability development (or innovation) process is divided into seven categories; basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), advanced technology development (6.3), demonstration and validation (6.4), engineering and manufacturing development (6.5), RDT&E management support (6.6) and operational systems development (6.7). Categories 6.1-6.3 are typically carried out in the research laboratories, while categories 6.4-6.7 are incorporated into the formal acquisition structure. The cultures of the two tiers of acquisition are quite different. Especially for the 6.1-6.2 funds, the work is primarily contracted out to universities and research institutes or performed by in-house scientists. The nature is exploratory and the expected time frames for results relatively long (i.e., 15-20 years, although more emphasis has been put on near term focus, 5-10 years, of late (AFRL website)). As the concept matures (6.2-6.3) the emphasis on military usefulness increases. Projects are expected to show obviously useful areas of application; as a result, there is pressure to focus on near term development. For both the fundamental and applied research, projects are siloed by discipline and collaboration across disciplines is limited. On the formal acquisition side, the emphasis is obviously on immediate usefulness in the project and there is an expectation that the technology is mature and nearly ready to be implemented. The innovation at this stage primarily involves integrating the system components to accomplish a new task. Multiple system designs are typically funded through phase A, but only one is picked for development. While the acquisition system described above does nominally divide the spacecraft innovation process into phases, each of which has different expectations and cultures, the categories and strategies in each do not align with either the Utterback-Abernathy 18 or Henderson-Clark 10 breakdown. Firstly, the research environment of the DoD technology development phase has a completely different effect on innovation than the entrepreneurial inventing environment of the fluid phase. Research is about exploration without a strong focus on how the results can be applied, while inventing is about taking what's known and making it useful. Research is collaborative, building on colleagues' insights; inventing is about competition -being the first to figure it out. Of course, inventors need research to be done, to generate new "knowns," but, it is inventors who generate the "creative destruction" at the heart of economic growth and innovation. 20 Thus, while 6.1-6.2 funds, and the laboratory structure, may generate breakthrough fundamental research, the applied value of those efforts won't be fully captured unless they get into the hands of inventors. This is the real implication of the lack of natural bottom-up push; an entrepreneurial environment is extremely difficult to manufacture and without it, innovation suffers.
The second limitation of the technology development and formal acquisition categorizations is that the former focuses primarily on developing component knowledge, leaving the dimension of architectural knowledge to the latter. This is an effective approach when the system level change is modular (see Fig. 4 ) as is the case with, for example, incorporating an advanced communication payload into a satellite with an otherwise standard architecture. However, when the system-level change is architecturally or radically innovative, mature component technology does not necessarily align with existing System Program Offices that are structured around legacy subsystem boundaries. Technology readiness needs to be defined along both the component and architectural dimensions.
The potential for improvements offered by ORS
As discussed above, ORS has the potential to incentivize (more) entrepreneurial contributions to space capability development and cut across the traditional tier system by carrying out both component and system development. As discussed in Frostman, 21 separation of entrepreneurial business units from mainstream business practices is important to prevent suppression of innovation. By focusing on operational experimentation for meeting existing requirements, ORS acquisitions are exempt from a traditional JCIDS approach. In addition, by emphasizing modular and flexible designs, ORS is able to rapidly integrate component-level technology innovation and may demonstrate the value of a more flexible design paradigm, for the current acquisition system. ORS platforms may also complement existing traditional space architectures by providing test beds for the on-orbit experimentation and maturation of emerging technologies outside of large scale acquisition programs-consistent with the "back to basics" philosophy.
B. Issue 2b: Too strong an emphasis on success can inhibit innovation
Perhaps the biggest difference among the three phases is the extent to which innovation can be planned. Once a dominant design emerges (in the transitional phase) innovation can be achieved by systematically making incremental improvements along particular dimensions, but until that point, there is much less certainty about what will work. In the transitional and specific phase, increasingly formal organizational structures are put in place, and those structures facilitate the optimization aspect of the innovation process. Conversely, the fluid phase start-ups have very little in the way of organizational structure, in part because there is no consensus on how the creativity is best encouraged. 22 Another reason is that many innovations fail to make it out of the fluid phase. Most successful entrepreneurs failed several times before they succeeded; and fail again many times afterwards. These are not risks that big companies typically take; it requires an undying belief in one's product that is often associated with entrepreneurs. 23 As a result, society doesn't have a high expectation for the success of start-ups and it's not remarkable when they fail; this not the case with space systems.
Despite the fact that many new spacecraft are, for all intents and purposes, prototypes (i.e., inventions) at the system level, a high level of risk aversion characterizes U.S. space architecture. There are many reasons for the conservatism that exists in the system. Unlike most terrestrial systems, once a spacecraft is launched, if anything goes wrong, it is extremely difficult to fix. As well, the act of launching the system, which is the only way to really test its survivability in the harsh environment of space, is extremely expensive. Thus there is an extremely high premium on getting it right the first time. In part because spacecraft tend to be so expensive, there is also a high political cost to failure. Unlike in the fluid phase of traditional markets, where inventors get little attention until they succeed, space projects are highly visible. What's more, there is little public appreciation for the experimental nature of most first flights, reinforcing the need to succeed the first time. However if radically different solutions are to arise, there is a need to shelter innovators from the constraining pressures of success (e.g., 12 launches of the revolutionary CORONA photoreconnaissance satellite were required before a successful demonstration of film capsule recovery on the 13 th flight 24 ).
Extent to which the current DoD structure resolves the issue
The high cost of launching spacecraft combined with a focus on traditional strategic measures of effectiveness in the space industry (e.g., optimize cost-per-function) has driven U.S. space architecture from an era of singlepayload, short-lived spacecraft to the current state of multi-payload, long-lived systems. While this design philosophy is justified on the basis of economic arguments associated with the high initial cost of spacecraft and enabled by improvements in supporting subsystems, this design philosophy also has many negative implications. For example, noting that space system developments now take five to ten years, Brown 25 describes how "complexity has bred fragility" in terms of unanticipated modes of failure. Such unanticipated modes of failure include an acquisitions crisis 14 where development problems with an individual sensor can cripple the schedule and budget of multi-payload programs (e.g., the National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System), on-orbit failures that circumvent margin and redundancy, 26 and uncertain technological change. The blue ribbon panels' recommendations (Fig. 6) emphasize the need to conduct more technology development outside the acquisition structure. This will have the positive effect of sheltering high risk developments from the public eye, but it only addresses the component level issue. As discussed above, system integration is, at a minimum, architectural innovation (but often radical innovation) and requires a fluid phase of free experimentation too. Without more system level technology demonstration missions, or a change in expectations regarding first-time mission success, innovation will be stifled.
The potential for improvements offered by ORS
ORS represents a major change in mentality, shifting from a performance oriented risk-averse paradigm, to a "good enough" approach; trading some failures for cost and schedule. 27 In addition to obtaining capability on-orbit quickly, ORS's attributes include tactical control and assured access. Assured access refers to the potential ability of small, tactical spacecraft to be used to partially reconstitute Air Force space mission areas (i.e., Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Position, Navigation, and Timing; Communications; Environmental Sensing; Missile Warning; and Space Control) should adversaries negate existing space capabilities. 28 If this radical shift in organizational priorities can be achieved (and the ORS economic assumptions are validated), it may create the forum for experimentation that the system sorely needs.
IV. Conclusion
Characteristics of the space market, with its monopsony-oligopoly structure and complex robust products, make encouraging innovation challenging. The DoD acquisition structure represents one example of how these challenges are addressed in an institutional setting. However a recent string of failures has brought into question the efficacy of the system. Multiple blue ribbon panels have been convened leading to recommendations about how the current system can be improved; however these recommendations take certain implicit assumptions of the system as a given. If a major reform is to be achieved, it is these fundamental assumptions that must be reviewed. This paper takes a step back from the acquisition process, using innovation theory to assess the intrinsic challenges of encouraging complex product innovation in a government monopsony-oligopoly. By structuring the analysis around these root-cause challenges, this work contributes to the acquisition reform discussion by providing a baseline for identifying ways that the system could be different. The ORS paradigm is used to speculate about how this might be implemented initially.
Two core challenges of generating innovation in national security space are 1) to enable bottom-up initiative despite being a monopsony and 2) to foster an entrepreneurial environment for both component and system level concept development within the otherwise highly risk-averse system. The DoD acquisition system addresses these challenges through a two-tiered process that separates technology development from project-based acquisition. However this method of separation fails to value the importance of architectural innovation; it is not good enough to have mature component technology if the overall system is radically new. In addition, the complex organizational structure that exists to create this separation creates a disaggregated knowledge base which exacerbates the difficulty of top-down specification and bottom-up integration. Overall, the acquisition system succeeds in creating new capabilities for integration into future programs through brute force (i.e., without managing to generate the independent bottom-up initiative that is needed for more rapid innovation).
The ORS paradigm has the potential to resolve parts of this issue by generating a more dynamic acquisition environment. The change in focus from the traditional approach (of performance at all costs, highly customized and designed to serve multiple users at once) to the ORS approach (of single-use, on-demand and "good-enough") will generate more opportunities for new capabilities to be "needed," and potentially incentivize supply-side initiative. This shift in design philosophy should also reduce the political cost of on-orbit failure and allow the necessary experimentation to occur. Finally, by keeping the ORS office small and streamlined, many of the bureaucratic challenges of the formal structure will hopefully be avoided. In particular, the ORS intention to develop both components and systems will minimize the knowledge disaggregation issues and the direct input from the Joint Combatant Commanders will facilitate needs representation. However, such a significant philosophical change will be no small task and it remains to be seen how effectively these changes can be implemented.
While this paper focused on the ORS case in particular, the innovation theory approach it employs can be used to assess acquisition structures in general. In this paper, the emphasis was on framing the key problems, with less attention given to details of either the DoD acquisition structure or the proposed ORS paradigm; however, additional insight can be gained from more detailed case study analysis. Further, by using the approach to examine other government spacecraft acquisition structures (e.g., NASA, ESA, JAXA), not only will the methodology be refined, cross-comparison may identify more efficient approaches to encouraging innovation in monopsony-oligopoly markets. Both these areas will be the subject of future work.
